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Abstract
Science in Theology
Studies in the Interaction Between Late Medieval 
Natural Philosophy, Logic, and Theology
Olli Hallamaa
University of Helsinki
The thesis consists of four separately published articles and a summary.
Three of the articles are research papers and the fourth comprises the
critical edition of questions 3, 4 and 5 from Roger Roseth’s Lectura su-
per Sententias. The aim of the study is to make Roseth’s text available
for historical study and to trace the close relation between late medieval
theology and teaching and research in the faculties of arts.
Historians of medieval intellectual history commonly emphasise that
the institutional organisation of the universities contributed to the in-
tellectual unity of medieval science. The basic training medieval schol-
ars received in logic and philosophy established scientific ideals and
practises which they applied in the higher faculties of theology, law, and
medicine. While medieval logic and natural philosophy have received
attention in modern scholarship, their role in late medieval theology
still remains a largely unexplored area.
The research articles focus on essential topics in Aristotelian natural
philosophy and logic and their relation to theology. The themes of the
articles are: the theory of the mathematical infinite and its relation to
divine omnipotence; the theory of change, in particular the models for
ascribing limits to continuous processes such as the augmentation of
charity; and the application of Aristotelian logic to Trinitarian inferenc-
es. 
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The Background
In a number of scholarly articles John E. Murdoch has shown that late
medieval academic learning was based on the commonly accepted sci-
entific ideals constituting what he called ”the unitary character” of me-
dieval scholarship.1 According to Murdoch, social and intellectual
factors contributed to this unity. The social factor refers to the organi-
sation of academic curriculum: all students striving for a degree in the
higher faculties of theology, law, and medicine had to complete a de-
gree in arts or have the equivalent knowledge. Common basic training
brought about intellectual unity, which shows in widely accepted
scientific ideals, methodology, and practices in research. Among
Murdoch’s key witnesses for the influence which the arts curriculum
exerted on other fields is the Franciscan theologian Roger Roseth.
At the time Roseth was writing his major work, Lectura super Senten-
tias, logic and natural philosophy were flourishing in Oxford. In partic-
ular, Merton College had recruited several outstanding scholars who
cultivated logic, mathematics, and speculative physics. Among the
Mertonians were Richard Billingham, Thomas Bradwardine, Thomas
Buckingham, Walter Burley, John Dumbleton, William Heytesbury,
and Richard Swyneshead. Although the Mertonians outnumbered oth-
er arts scholars, other academic institutions also had eminent scholars
such as Richard Kilvington or Roger Swyneshead. They all made con-
tributions to logic and philosophy, but many of them continued their
studies and published works in theology as well.
Along with Merton College, the mendicant convents at Oxford
were centres of excellence in research, housing scholars like William
Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Robert Halifax, Roger Roseth, Robert
1 E.g. John E. Murdoch, ”From Social to Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the
Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning”, in: The Cultural Context of Medieval
Learning, ed. by J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science 26. Dortrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1975, 271–348 and John E.
Murdoch, ”Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta: The Rise and Develop-
ment of the Application of Mathematics in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy and The-
ology,” in: Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge: actes du quatriéme congrés international
de philosophie médiévale, Montreál: Institut d’études médiévales – Paris: Librairie philos-
ophique J. Vrin 1969, 215–254.
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Holcot, and William Crathorn. Like their secular colleagues in the arts
faculty, Greyfriars and Blackfriars had to study logic and philosophy be-
fore entering the university for a higher theological education. Some
mendicants even published works on arts subjects. Well trained mendi-
cants and former arts masters employed the scientific ideas they had
learned while studying the arts in their theological works, and thus es-
tablished an unconventional new approach that has been characterized
as the mathematization of theology.
The studies that constitute this dissertation address the English the-
ology of the 1330s. Since most of the sources elucidating this unique
period in the history of theology still remain unedited, and are thus ac-
cessible only to scholars familiar with medieval paleography, the present
study includes a critical edition from Roger Roseth’s Lectura super Sen-
tentias [IV], which is good example of Theologia Anglicana, fourteenth
century mathematical English theology. The research articles shed light
on the use of logic and physics in Roseth’s text.
Though Roseth’s Lectura is an important witness for the Theologia An-
glicana, hitherto it has awakened only exiguous scholarly interest. With
the exception of the above mentioned articles by John E. Murdoch,
modern historians of medieval thought have rarely used Roseth as a
source. Roseth’s name probably appears for the first time in a modern
study in 1925 when K. Michalski identified the author of Lectura super
Sententias in the MS. Oxford, Oriel College 15 as Roger Rosseti, but
presumed that the name was a variant of the name Swyneshead.2 In 1941
Marshall Clagett corrected Michalski’s assumption and announced that
the author was an English Franciscan ”Roger Royseth”. Clagett also
identified two more manuscripts in which Roseth’s Lectura was pre-
served.3 Twelve years later Victorin P. Doucet extended the list with
nine new manuscripts.4 Studies on Roseth’s thought include Simo Knu-
2 Published in: ”Le Criticisme et le Scepticisme dans la Philosophie du XIVe siecle,” in:
Bulletin International de l’Academie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres, Classe de philologie.
Classe d’historie et de philosophie, L’Année 1925, Part I, pp. 47, 79; quoted through
Marshall Clagett, Giovanni Marliani and Late Medieval Physics. Studies in History, Econom-
ics, and Public Law, no. 483, New York: Columbia University Press 1941, 172–173.
3 Clagett 1941, 172–173. See also Marshall Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the
Middle Ages. University of Wisconsin Publications in Medieval Science 4. Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959, 204.
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uttila’s research on the rise of deontic logic,5 Katherine H. Tachau’s work
on the history of epistemology at Oxford in the second quarter of the
fourteenth century,6 and Angel d’Ors’s article on deontic semantical par-
adoxes.7 The current state of research still leaves many unexplored areas
in Roseth’s thought.
The Articles
[I] Infinity is the topic in medieval natural philosophy that has an inher-
ent counterpart in theology, because of God’s omnipotence. But
whereas in physics infinity is brought about by an unending series of ad-
dition or division, in theology infinity originates from God’s perfec-
tions and is thus metaphysical. In Aristotelian terms the mathematical
infinity created by the unending series is potential, while theological in-
finity is actual by nature.
Roseth’s principal concern appears to be how God’s infinity relates
to mathematical infinity. He shared the traditional Aristotelian postulate
that only potential infinity is acceptable in the created order; in the nat-
ural world no creature, not even the angels, are able to perform infinite
operations or possess infinite attributes. Therefore the computing of an
unending series of proportional parts in a continuum or suffering infi-
nite pain in damnation is not possible for creatures. God, due to His
omnipotence, is able to perceive infinitesimal proportional parts of a
4 Victorin P. Doucet, ”Le studium franciscain de Norwich en 1337 d’après le ms
Chigi B. V. 66 de la bibliotheque Vaticane”, AFH 46 (1953), 85-98.
5 Simo Knuuttila, ”The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century”,
in: R. Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions, and the Foundations of
Ethics, Synthese Library, Vol. 152, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981, 225–248; Simo Knuuttila,
Modalities in Medieval Philosophy. London: Routledge 1993, 190–196. 
6 Katherine H. Tachau, ”The Problem of the Species in Medio at Oxford in the
Generation After Ockham”, in: Medieval Studies 44 (1982), 394–443.
7 Angel d’Ors, ”Insolubiles deónticos (Robert Holcot y Roger Roseth)”, in: Acta
philosophica 4 (1991), 173–188. 
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continuum or deal with any other mathematical object produced by an
infinite series. However, Roseth noted that God’s omnipotence is re-
stricted by the laws of mathematics. Thus mathematics is a true coun-
terpart of logic in defining logical possibilities: just as God’s absolute
power is restricted by his inability to bring about a contradiction, God
cannot violate the laws of mathematics either. According to Roseth
God’s omnipotence does not dissolve general rationality even though
it makes God a supreme calculator to whom infinite series are accessi-
ble. To creatures, infinite series are unattainable, and for them the
mathematical infinite does not bring an understanding of God’s actual
infinity.
[II] The second article presents a case study of a logical puzzle (sophisma)
that appears in Roseth’s discussion on the augmentation of charity.
Charity as a quality is susceptible to change, as are the entities falling
under the categories of quantity, place (local motion), and substance. In
the category of substance, change denotes generation or corruption of
creatures and implicates an instantaneous change. By contrast, change
in the other three categories involves a process, and therefore increment
or reduction of quality, quantity or motion must be continuous.
In Aristotelian natural philosophy, continuity was understood in
terms of infinite divisibility, i.e. every continuous magnitude was con-
sidered to be a continuum with arbitrarily many cut-off points. These
points or instants of time are extensionless; no continua were composed
of these cutting points. For this reason, between any two chosen two
points or instants, there must always be an infinite number of points or
instants. Thus, the Aristotelian prerequisite for a continuous magnitude
was that it is not composed of contiguous extensive parts, i.e. atoms. 
This concept of continuity raised several theoretical issues. Among
them was the question of determining the first and last instants of
change. This ”limit decision problem” originated from the fact that
contradictory or contrary states of affairs cannot prevail simultaneously
and there are no contiguous instants of time. Therefore the first instant
of change must be defined either as the last instant of rest (extrinsic lim-
it) or as the first instant of change (intrinsic limit). Respectively the ter-
minating instant is either the last instant of change (intrinsic limit) or
the first instant of rest (extrinsic limit). 
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The ”limit decision problem” originated with Aristotle, but the me-
dieval schoolmen systematized the theory further by defining rules for
determining the types of limit for various types of changes. These rules
were then applied to increasingly complicated imaginary examples in
which several variables could contribute to the choice of limit. Roseth
made use of one of these logical puzzles when he discussed the augmen-
tation of charity.
Roseth used the sophisma to prove the principle that unanimated
entities increase only in the improper sense of the word. The principle
states that, unlike living creatures, unanimated entities, such as charity,
increase by gaining new units of the same species. Accepting this prin-
ciple entails, Roseth claimed, the truth of the problematic thesis that
Socrates will have twice the charity which Plato will have at instant A,
when they now begin to have charity for one hour, and Socrates’ char-
ity increases two times faster than Plato’s, and suppose that Socrates is
dead at instant A , which terminates the hour, and Plato is alive at A.
The subsequent discussion shows that the logical puzzle, when properly
analysed, does not contradict the original principle.
The sophisma Roseth made use of is virtually the same as the tenth
sophisma of Richad Kilvington’s collection of logical riddles. Even
though Roseth shared with Kilvington the traditional Aristotelian pos-
tulates concerning limit decisions, he also widened his analysis to areas,
such as infinite series, which Kilvington did not discuss. The genre of
the sophisma, then, was thus one of the analytical tools Roseth applied
to the theoretical question at hand, and consequently the thought ex-
periment from physics became part of the methodology in theology.
[III] The employment of logic in a theological context generated diffi-
culties, which seemed to jeopardize the rationality of theology. The
problems arising in certain Trinitarian syllogisms, in which the premises
were true according to faith but the conclusion manifestly unorthodox,
gave the impression that either logic was not, as it was considered to be,
universally valid, or that the Christian faith was not rational; both alter-
natives were horrifying to medieval schoolmen.
Several authors addressed the problem of Trinitarian paralogisms at
Oxford. William Ockham made constant use of Trinitarian examples
in his Summa logicae, showing that problematic Trinitarian inferences
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are either fallacies or invalid syllogisms. The anonymous author of Cen-
tiloquium theologicum8 looked for the solution in a non-Aristotelian logic
of faith, whereas Adam Wodeham defended Aristotelian logic and the
rationality of the Christian faith along Ockham’s line of thought. Roger
Roseth was influenced by these two fellow Franciscans and presented a
set of rules with which Trinitarian paralogisms could be separated from
valid inferences.
Roseth employs two principles to analyse the validity of syllogisms.
First, every good syllogism must comply with the predication rule dic-
tum de omni vel nullo. This rule expresses a kind of class inclusion that
prevails between the premises: all the entities denoted by the minor
premise must fall under the scope of the major premise. The rule applies
to all syllogisms, not only to first figure syllogisms but also to third fig-
ure syllogisms with premises having singular terms as subject terms: ex-
pository syllogisms. Whether or not a syllogism is regulated by the
predication rule can be revealed by a simple procedure: the premises are
transformed into universal propositions with a circumscription by add-
ing the prefix omne quod est to the beginning of the sentence. Para-
phrased premises reveal the syllogistic structure and make it easier to
detect whether the syllogism is regulated by the dictum de omni vel nullo. 
The second method is to analyse the supposition of the terms in the
premises. In Roseth’s parlance the Trinitarian terms have either an es-
sential or a personal supposition. A term having a personal supposition
stands for one of the persons within the Trinity, while a term with an
essential supposition refers to divine essence. In a valid syllogism the
supposition must remain the same throughout the inference: if the sup-
position varies, the syllogism is invalid and the untrue conclusion is not
a threat to the syllogistics or to the rationality of faith.
8 Edited by Ph. Böhner and G. I. Etzkorn and published among the dubious works
of William Ockham in his Opera philosophica et theologica, Opera philosophica 8,
St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: St. Bonaventure University 1988. The author of the Centolo-
quium was probably the Dominican Arnold of Strelley, who read the Sentences at
Oxford between 1323 and 1330 and was a regent master in theology in the early
1330s. See Hester Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and
Necessity in Dominican Theology At Oxford 1300–1350. Studien und Texte zur Geistes-
geschichte des Mittelalters, Bd 81. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004, 79–83.
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Roseth’s solution to the Trinitarian paralogisms seems to to a certain
extent be designed for theological purposes, and it could therefore ap-
pear to represent a nonstandard logic of faith. Roseth is, however,
aware of this unwelcome interpretation and rejects it, emphasizing that
the same analysis used for Trinitarian paralogisms is to be used in phi-
losophy as well. This is because similar problems also arise in Platonic
metaphysics. In Plato’s philosophy the relation of the forms to individ-
uals resembles the relation of the divine essence to the persons in the
Trinity and creates similar logical problems. These can be resolved with
the rules and techniques Roseth applies to the Trinitarian paralogisms.
Therefore, Roseth maintained that none of his rules were merely the-
ological.
[IV] The last article in this thesis includes a critical edition of questions
three, four and five of Roger Roseth’s Lectura super Sententias. The edi-
tion is based on all extant manuscripts. The edition involves an intro-
ductory article which describes the manuscripts, text history, and
Roseth’s intellectual milieu.
